Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology by Li, Anqi & Yang, Ming
Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous
Monitoring Technology
Anqi Li∗ Ming Yang†
This Draft: September 2019
Abstract
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze
sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost.
We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring
technology that governs the above procedure is part of the designer’s strate-
gic planning. In otherwise standard principal-agent models with moral hazard,
we allow the principal to partition agents’ performance data into any finite
categories and to pay for the amount of information that the output signal
carries. Through analysis of the trade-off between giving incentives to agents
and saving the monitoring cost, we obtain characterizations of optimal mon-
itoring technologies such as information aggregation, strict MLRP, likelihood
ratio-convex performance classification, group evaluation in response to rising
monitoring costs, and assessing multiple task performances according to agents’
endogenous tendencies to shirk. We examine the implications of these results
for workforce management and firms’ internal organizations.
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1 Introduction
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze so-
phisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. Speech
analytics software, natural language processing tools and cloud-based systems are in-
creasingly used to convert hard-to-process contents into succinct and meaningful rat-
ings such as “satisfactory” and “unsatisfactory” (Murff et al. (2011); Singer (2013);
Kaplan (2015)). This paper develops a theory of optimal incentive contracting where
the monitoring technology that governs the above procedure is part of the designer’s
strategic planning.
Our research agenda is motivated by the case of call center performance manage-
ment reported by Singer (2013). It has long been recognized that the conversations
between call center agents and customers contain useful performance indicators such
as customer sentiment, voice quality and tone, etc.. Recently, the advent of speech
analytics software has finally enabled the processing and analysis of these contents,
as well as their conversions into meaningful ratings such as “satisfactory” and “un-
satisfactory.” On the one hand, running speech analytics software consumes server
space and power, and the procedure has been increasingly outsourced to third par-
ties in order to take advantage of the latest development in cloud computing. On
the other hand, managers now have considerable freedom to decide which facets of
the customer conversation to utilize, thanks to the increased availability of products
whose specialties range from emotion detection to word spotting.
We formalize the flexibility and the cost associated with the design and imple-
mentation of the monitoring technology in otherwise standard principal-agent models
with moral hazard. Specifically, we allow the monitoring technology to partition
agents’ performance data into any finite categories, at a cost that increases with the
amount of information that the output signal carries (hereinafter, monitoring cost).
An incentive contract pairs the monitoring technology with a wage scheme that maps
realizations of the output signal to different wages. An optimal contract minimizes the
sum of expected wage and monitoring cost, subject to agents’ incentive constraints.
Our main result gives characterizations of optimal monitoring technologies in gen-
eral environments, showing that the assignment of Lagrange multiplier-weighted likeli-
hood ratios to performance categories is positive assortative in the direction of agent
utilities. Geometrically, this means that optimal monitoring technologies comprise
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convex cells in the space of likelihood ratios or their transformations. This result pro-
vides practitioners with the needed formula for sorting employee performance data,
and exploiting its geometry yields insights into workforce management and firms’
internal organizations.
Our proof strategy works directly with the principal’s Lagrangian. It handles gen-
eral situations featuring multiple agents and multiple tasks, in which the direction of
sorting vector-valued likelihood ratios is nonobvious a priori. Furthermore, it over-
comes the technical challenge whereby perturbations of the sorting algorithm affect
wages endogenously through the Lagrange multipliers of agents’ incentive constraints,
yielding effects that are new and difficult to assess using standard methods.
We give three applications of our result. In the single-agent model considered in
Holmstro¨m (1979), we show that the assignment of likelihood ratios to wage categories
is positive assortative and follows a simple cutoff rule. The monitoring technology
aggregates potentially high-dimensional performance data into rank-ordered ratings,
and the output signal satisfies the strict monotone likelihood ratio property with
respect to the order induced by likelihood ratios. Solving the cutoff likelihood ra-
tios yields consistent findings with recent developments in manufacturing, retail and
healthcare sectors, where decreases in the data processing cost have increased the
fineness of the performance grids (Bloom and Van Reenen (2006, 2007); Murff et al.
(2011); Ewenstein et al. (2016)).
In the multi-agent model considered in Holmstro¨m (1982), the optimal monitor-
ing technology partitions vectors of individual agents’ likelihood ratios into convex
polygons. Based on this result, we then compare individual and group performance
evaluations from the angle of monitoring cost, showing that firms should switch from
individual evaluation to group evaluation in response to rising monitoring costs. This
result formalizes the theses of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Lazear and Rosen
(1981) that either team or tournament should be the dominant incentive system
when individual performance evaluation is too costly to conduct. It is consistent with
the findings of Bloom and Van Reenen (2006, 2007), namely the lack of IT access
increases the use of group performance evaluation among otherwise similar firms.
In the presence of multiple tasks as in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991), the re-
sources spent on the assessment of a task performance should increase with the agent’s
endogenous tendency to shirk the corresponding task. Using simulation, we apply this
result to the study of, e.g., how improved precision of some task measurements (e.g.,
3
the availability of high-quality scanner data measuring the skillfulness in scanning
items) would affect the resources spent on the assessment of other task performances
(e.g., projecting warmth to customers).
1.1 Related Literature
Existing studies on contracting with costly experiments (in the sense of Blackwell
(1953)) include, but are not limited to: Banker and Datar (1980) and Dye (1986), in
which the principal can pay an external auditor for drawing a signal from an exoge-
nous distribution; Holmstro¨m (1979), Grossman and Hart (1983) and Kim (1995),
in which signal distributions are ranked based on the incentive costs they incur. In
these studies, the principal can change the probability space generated by the agent’s
hidden effort and, in the first two studies, through paying stylized costs. By contrast,
we focus on the conversion of raw data into performance ratings while taking the
former’s probability space as given. Moreover, our assumption that the monitoring
cost increases with the amount of information carried by the output signal could be
ill-suited for modeling the cost of running experiments.
The current work differs from the existing studies on rational inattention (here-
inafter, RI) in three aspects. First, early developments in RI by Sims (1998), Sims
(2003), Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009) and Woodford (2009) sought to explain
the stickiness of macroeconomic variables by information processing costs, whereas
we examine the implication of costly and yet flexible monitoring for principal-agent
relationships.1 Second, we focus mainly on partitional monitoring technologies be-
cause in reality, adding non-performance-related factors into employee ratings could
have dire consequences such as appeals, lawsuits and excessive turnover.2 Finally, our
monitoring cost function nests entropy as a special case.
Recent works of Cre´mer et al. (2007), Ja¨ger et al. (2011), Sobel (2015) and Dilme´
(2017) examine the optimal language used between organization members who share
a common interest but face communication costs. The absence of conflicting interests
1Yang (2019) studies a security design problem where a rationally inattentive buyer can obtain
any signal about the uncertain fundamental at a cost that is proportional to entropy reduction.
Other recent efforts to introduce RI into strategic environments include but are not limited to:
Mate´jka and McKay (2012), Martin (2017) and Ravid (2017).
2See standard HR textbooks for this subject matter. Saint-Paul (2011) demonstrates the validity
of entropy as an information cost in decision problems where the decision variable is a deterministic
function of the exogenous state variable.
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and incentive constraints distinguishes these works from ours.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
baseline model; Section 3 presents the main results; Sections 4 and 5 investigate
extensions of the baseline model; Section 6 concludes. See Appendix A for omitted
proofs, as well as the online appendix for supplementary materials.
2 Baseline Model
2.1 Setup
Primitives There is a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. The agent
earns a utility u (w) from spending a nonnegative wage w ≥ 0 and incurs a cost c (a)
from privately exerting either high effort (a = 1) or low effort (a = 0). The function
u : R+ → R satisfies u (0) = 0, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and c (1) = c > c (0) = 0.
Each effort a ∈ {0, 1} generates a probability space (Ω,Σ, Pa), where (1) Ω is a
finite-dimensional Euclidean space comprising the agent’s performance data, (2) Σ is
the Borel sigma-algebra on Ω, and (3) Pa is the probability measure on (Ω,Σ) condi-
tional on the effort being a. In particular, Pa’s are mutually absolutely continuous,
and the probability density function pa’s they induce are well-defined and everywhere
positive.
Incentive contract An incentive contract 〈P , w (·)〉 is a pair of monitoring tech-
nology P and wage scheme w : P → R+. The former represents a human- or
machine-operated system that governs the processing and analysis of performance
data, whereas the latter maps outputs of the first-step procedure to different levels
of wages. In the main body of this paper, P can be any partition of Ω with at most
K ≥ 2 cells—all of positive measures,3 and w : P → R+ maps each cell A of P to a
nonnegative wage w (A) ≥ 0.4
We impose two requirements on the monitoring technology P . First, all cells of
P must constitute measurable subsets of Ω and must have positive measures under
3In Appendix B.2, we allow the monitoring technology to be any mapping from Ω to lotteries
on finite performance categories. If the lottery is degenerate, then the monitoring technology is
partitional.
4Appendix B.1 examines the case where the agent faces an individual rationality constraint.
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Pa, a ∈ {0, 1}. Second, the size of P–also termed the rating scale–is bounded above
by an integer K ≥ 2, where the latter can be arbitrarily large and will be taken as
given throughout the analysis.5
For each data point ω ∈ Ω, let A (ω) be the unique performance category that
contains ω, and let w (A (ω)) be the wage associated with A (ω). Time evolves as
follows:
1. the principal commits to 〈P , w (·)〉;
2. the agent privately chooses a ∈ {0, 1};
3. Nature draws ω from Ω according to Pa;
4. the monitoring technology outputs A (ω);
5. the principal pays w (A (ω)) to the agent.
Implementation cost A monitoring technology P = {A1, · · · , AN} outputs a sig-
nal X : Ω→ P , whose probabilities Prob (X = An | a) = Pa (An), n = 1, · · · , N , un-
der effort a are compiled into a vector pi (P , a) = (Pa (A1) , · · · , Pa (AN) , 0, · · · , 0) in
the K-dimensional simplex. While X is often taken as given in the existing principal-
agent literature, here it is chosen by the principal as part of the incentive contract.
For any given level a ∈ {0, 1} of effort, the principal incurs the following cost from
implementing an incentive contract 〈P , w (·)〉:∑
A∈P
Pa (A)w (A) + µ ·H (P , a) .
This cost has two parts. The first part
∑
A∈P Pa (A)w (A), i.e., the incentive cost,
has been the central focus of the existing principal-agent literature. The second part
µ · H (P , a), hereinafter termed the monitoring cost, represents the cost associated
with the processing and analysis of the performance data. In particular, µ > 0 is an
exogenous parameter which we will further discuss in Section 3.4. The term H (P , a)
captures the amount of information carried by the output signal and is assumed to
satisfy the following properties:
5The upper bound K, while stylized, guarantees the existence of optimal incentive contract(s).
Judging from the simulation exercises we have so far conducted, the optimal rating scale is typically
smaller than K even when µ is small (see, e.g., Figure 1).
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Assumption 1. There exists a function h : ∆K → R+ such that H (P , a) = h (pi (P , a))
for any pair (P , a). Furthermore,
(a) h (pi1, · · · , piK) = h
(
piσ(1), · · · , piσ(K)
)
for any probability vector (pi1, · · · , piK) ∈
∆K and any permutation σ on {1, · · · , K};
(b) h (0, pi2, · · · ) < h (pi′1, pi′′2 , · · · ) for any (0, pi2, · · · ) and (pi′1, pi′2, · · · ) ∈ ∆K that differ
only in the first two elements and satisfy pi2, pi
′
1, pi
′
2 > 0 and pi2 = pi
′
1 + pi
′
2.
Assumption 1 is inspired by the basic principles of information theory. It stipulates
that the amount of information carried by the output signal should depend only on the
latter’s probability distribution and must increase with the fineness of the monitoring
technology. Aside from probabilities, nothing else matters, not even the naming or
the contents of the performance categories. Assumption 1 is satisfied by, e.g., the
entropy −∑A∈P Pa (A) log2 Pa (A) and the bits of information log2 |P| carried by the
output signal.6 In Section 2.2, we motivate the use of this assumption in the example
of call center performance management.
The principal’s problem Consider the problem of inducing high effort from the
agent.7 Define a random variable Z : Ω→ R by
Z (ω) = 1− p0 (ω)
p1 (ω)
∀ω,
where p0 (ω) /p1 (ω) is the likelihood ratio associated with data point ω. Note that
E [Z | a = 1] = 0 and that the range of Z is a subset of (−∞,−1). For any set A ∈ Σ
of positive measure, define the z-value of A by
z(A) = E [Z | A; a = 1] .
In words, z (A) represents the average value of Z conditional on the data point being
drawn from A.
6The bit is a basic unit of information in information theory, computing, and digital communi-
cations. In information theory, one bit is defined as the maximum information entropy of a binary
random variable.
7The problem of inducing low effort is standard.
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A contract 〈P , w (·)〉 is incentive compatible if∑
A∈P
P1 (A)u (w (A))− c ≥
∑
A∈P
P0 (A)u (w (A))
or, equivalently, ∑
A∈P
P1 (A)u (w (A)) z (A) ≥ c, (IC)
and it satisfies the limited liability constraint if
w (A) ≥ 0 ∀A ∈ P . (LL)
An optimal incentive contract that induces high effort from the agent (or optimal
incentive contract for short) minimizes the total implementation cost under high
effort, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint and limited liability constraint:
min
〈P,w(·)〉
∑
A∈P
P1 (A)w (A) + µ ·H (P , 1) s.t. (IC) and (LL).
In what follows, we will denote the solution(s) to the above problem by 〈P∗, w∗ (·)〉.
2.2 Monitoring Cost
In this section, we first illustrate Assumption 1 in the context of call center perfor-
mance management:
Example 1. In the example described in Section 1, a piece of performance data com-
prises the major characteristics of a call history (e.g., customer sentiment and voice
quality) as encoded in binary digits. The monitoring technology refers to the part of
the speech analytics program that categorizes these binary digits into performance
ratings. To formalize the design flexibility, we allow the monitoring technology to
partition the performance data into any N ≤ K categories, where K can be any
interger greater than one. The cost of running the monitoring technology is assumed
to increase with the amount of processed information, whose definition varies from
case to case. For example, if the monitoring technology runs many times among
many identical agents, then the optimal design should minimize the average steps it
takes to find the performance category containing the raw data point. By now, it is
well known that this quantity equals approximately the entropy of the output signal.
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By contrast, if the monitoring technology runs only a few times for a few number
of agents, then the worst-case (or unamortized) amount of processed information is
best captured by the bits of information carried by the output signal (see, e.g., Cover
and Thomas (2006)). In both cases, the quantity of our interest depends only on the
probability distribution of the output signal and nothing else.
We next introduce the concept of setup cost and distinguish it from our notion of
monitoring cost:
Example 1 (Continued). As its name suggests, setup cost refers the cost incurred to
set up the infrastructure that facilitates data processing and analysis. Examples of
the latter include: Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) chips—which transform sound
waves into their major characteristics (as encoded in binary digits), recording devices,
etc..
The major role of setup cost is to change the probability space (Ω,Σ, Pa). For
example, design improvements in FFT chips enable more frequent sampling of sound
waves and cause changes in (Ω,Σ, Pa). In what follows, we will take the probability
space as given and ignore the setup cost. That said, one can certainly embed our
analysis into a two-stage setting in which the principal first incurs the setup cost and
then the monitoring cost. Results below will carry over to this new setting.
3 Analysis
3.1 Preview
Example 2. Suppose u (w) =
√
w, Z is uniformly distributed over [−1/2, 1/2] under
a = 1 and H (P , a) = f (|P|) for some strictly increasing function f : {2, · · · , K} →
R+. Below we walk through the key steps in solving the optimal incentive contract,
give closed-form solutions and discuss their practical implications.
Optimal wage scheme We first solve for the optimal wage scheme for any given
monitoring technology P as in Holmstro¨m (1979). Specifically, label the performance
categories as A1, · · · , AN , and write pin = P1 (An) and zn = z (An) for n = 1, · · · , N .
Assume zj 6= zk for some j, k ∈ {1, · · · , N} to make the analysis interesting. The
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principal’s problem is then:
min
{wn}
N∑
n=1
pinwn,
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pin
√
wnzn ≥ c, (IC)
and wn ≥ 0, n = 1, · · · , N. (LL)
Straightforward algebra yields the expression for the minimal incentive cost:
c2
 N∑
n=1
pin max {0, zn}2︸ ︷︷ ︸
wn
−1 . (3.1)
A careful inspection of (3.1) reveals Holmstro¨m’s (1979) sufficient statistics principle,
namely z-value is the only part of the performance data that provides the agent with
incentives.
Optimal monitoring technology We next solve for the optimal monitoring tech-
nology. First, note that the principal should partition the performance data based
only on their z-values and that different performance categories must attain different
z-values and wages. The reason combines the sufficient statistic principle with As-
sumption 1(b), saying that merging performance categories of the same z-value saves
the monitoring cost while leaving the incentive cost (3.1) unaffected.
A more interesting question concerns how we should assign the various data points,
identified by their z-values, to different performance categories. In the baseline model
featuring a single agent and binary efforts, the answer to this question is relatively
straightforward: assign high (resp. low) z-values to high-wage (resp. low-wage)
categories. Here is a quick proof of this result: since the left-hand side of the (IC)
constraint is supermodular in wages and z-values, if our conjecture were false, then
reshuffling data points as above while holding the probabilities of the performance
categories constant reduces the incentive cost (3.1) while leaving the monitoring cost
unaffected and thus constitutes an improvement to the monitoring technology.8
When extending the above intuition to general settings featuring multiple agents
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this intuition.
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or multiple actions, we face two challenges. First, in the case where z-values and wages
are vectors, the direction of sorting these objects is nonobvious a priori. Second,
changes in the sorting algorithm affect wages endogenously through the Lagrange
multipliers of the incentive constraints, yielding effects that are new and difficult to
assess using standard methods.
The proof strategy presented in Section 3.3 overcomes these challenges, showing
that the assignment of Lagrange multiplier-weighted z-values to performance cate-
gories must be positive assortative in the direction of agent utilities. Geometrically,
this means that any optimal monitoring technology must comprise convex cells in the
space of z-values or their transformations. Theorems 1, 3 and 5 formalize the above
statements.
Implications An important feature of the optimal monitoring technology is in-
formation aggregation—a term used by human resource practitioners to refer to the
aggregation of potentially high-dimensional performance data into rank-ordered rat-
ings such as “satisfactory” and “unsatisfactory.”
The geometry of the optimal monitoring technology sheds light on the practical
issues covered in Sections 3.4, 4.3 and 5.1. Consider, for example, optimal perfor-
mance grids. In the current example, it can be shown that the optimal N -partitional
monitoring technology divides to the space [−1/2, 1/2] of z-values into N adjacent
intervals [ẑn−1, ẑn), n = 1, · · · , N , where ẑ0 = −1/2 and ẑN = 1/2. The optimal cut
points {ẑn}N−1n=1 can be solved as follows:
min
{ẑn}N−1n=1
c2
[
N∑
n=1
pin max{0, zn}2
]−1
− µ · f (N) ,
where
pin =
∫ ẑn
ẑn−1
dZ = ẑn − ẑn−1,
and
zn =
1
pin
∫ ẑn
ẑn−1
ZdZ =
1
2
[ẑn + ẑn−1] .
Straightforward algebra yields:
ẑn =
2n− 1
4N − 2 , n = 1, · · · , N − 1.
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Based on this result, as well as the functional form of f , we can then solve for the
optimal rating scale N and hence the optimal incentive contract completely.
3.2 Main Results
This section analyzes optimal incentive contracts. Results below hold true except
perhaps on a measure zero set of data points. The same disclaimer applies to the
remainder of this paper.
We first define the concept of Z-convexity :
Definition 1. A set A ∈ Σ is Z-convex if the following holds for any ω′, ω′′ ∈ A such
that Z (ω′) 6= Z (ω′′):
{ω ∈ Ω : Z (ω) = (1− s) · Z (ω′) + s · Z (ω′′) for some s ∈ (0, 1)} ⊂ A.
In words, a set A ∈ Σ is Z-convex if whenever it contains data points of different
z-values, it must also contain all data points of intermediate z-values. Let Z (A)
denote the image of any set A ∈ Σ under the mapping Z. In the case where Z (Ω)
is a connected set in R, the above definition is equivalent to the convexity of the set
Z (A) in R.
A few assumptions before we go into detail. The next assumption says that the
distribution of Z has no atom or hole:
Assumption 2. Z is distributed atomlessly on a connected set Z (Ω) in R under
a = 1.
The next assumption says that Z (Ω) is compact set in R:
Assumption 3. Z (Ω) is a compact set in R.
The next assumption imposes regularities on the monitoring cost function: Part
(a) of it holds for the bits of information carried by the output signal, and Part (b)
of it holds for the entropy of the output signal:
Assumption 4. The function h : ∆K → R+ satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) h (pi (P , a)) = f (|P|) for some strictly increasing function f : {2, · · · , K} → R+;
(b) h is continuous.
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We now state our main results. The next theorem shows that any optimal incentive
contract assigns data points of high (resp. low) z-values to high-wage (resp. low-
wage) categories. Under Assumption 2, this can be achieved by first dividing z-values
into adjacent intervals and then backing out the partition of the original data space
accordingly. The result is an aggregation of potentially high-dimensional data into
rank-ordered ratings, as well as a wage scheme that is strictly increasing in these
ratings:
Theorem 1. Assume Assumption 1 and let 〈P∗, w∗ (·)〉 be any optimal incentive
contract that induces high effort from the agent. Then P∗ comprises Z-convex cells
labeled as A1, · · · , AN , where 0 = w∗ (A1) < · · · < w∗ (AN). Assume, in addition,
Assumption 2. Then there exist inf Z (Ω) := ẑ0 < ẑ1 < · · · < ẑN := supZ(Ω) such
that An = {ω : Z (ω) ∈ [ẑn−1, ẑn)} for n = 1, · · · , N .9
The next theorem proves existence of optimal incentive contract:
Theorem 2. An optimal incentive contract that induces high effort from the agent
exists under Assumptions 1-4.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
3.3 Proof Sketch for Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of three steps. The intuitions of steps one and two
have already been explained in Example 2. Step three is new.
Step one We first take any monitoring technology P as given and solve for the
optimal wage scheme as in Holmstro¨m (1979):
min
w:P→R+
∑
A∈P
P1 (A)w (A) s.t. (IC) and (LL). (3.2)
The next lemma restates Holmstro¨m’s (1979) sufficient statistic principle:
Lemma 1. Let w∗ (·;P) be any solution to (3.2). Then there exists λ > 0 such that
u′ (w∗ (A;P)) = 1/ (λz (A)) for any A ∈ P such that w∗ (A;P) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
9Under Assumption 2, the set of (finite) cut points has measure zero, so it is unimportant which
of the two adjacent intervals a cut point belongs to. The choice of expressing all intervals as right
half-open ones is purely aesthetic.
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Step two We next demonstrate that different performance categories must attain
different z-values and wages:
Lemma 2. Assume Assumption 1. Let 〈P∗, w∗ (·)〉 be any optimal incentive contract
that induces high effort from the agent, and label the cells of P∗ as A1, · · · , AN such
that z (A1) ≤ · · · ≤ z (AN). Then z (A1) < 0 < · · · < z (AN) and 0 = w∗ (A1) < · · · <
w∗ (AN).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Step three We finally demonstrate that the assignment of z-values into wage cate-
gories is positive assortative. In Example 2, we sketched a proof based on supermodu-
larity and pointed out the difficulties of extending that argument to multidimensional
environments. The argument below overcomes these difficulties.
Take any optimal incentive contract with Aj and Ak being two different per-
formance categories. From Lemma 2, we know that z (Aj) 6= z (Ak). For any
 > 0, take any A′ ⊂ Aj and A′′ ⊂ Ak such that P1 (A′) = P1 (A′′ ) =  and
z (A′) = z
′ 6= z (A′′ ) = z′′. In words, A′ and A′′ have the same probability  under
a = 1 but different z-values that are independent of . Lemma 3 of Appendix A.1.1
proves existence of A′ and A
′′
 when  is small.
Consider a perturbation to the monitoring technology that “swaps” A′ and A
′′
 .
Post the perturbation, the new performance categories, denoted by An ()’s, become
Aj () = (Aj\A′)∪A′′ , Ak () = (Ak\A′′ )∪A′ and An () = An for n 6= j, k. Since the
perturbation has no effect on the probabilities of the performance categories under
a = 1, it does not affect the monitoring cost by Assumption 1(a). Meanwhile, it
changes the principal’s Lagrangian to (ignore the (LL) constraint for ease):
L () =
∑
n
pin [wn ()− λ()u (wn ()) zn] + λ () c,
where pin denotes the probability of An (equivalently, An ()) under a = 1, wn ()
denotes the optimal wage at An (), and λ () the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the (IC) constraint. A careful inspection of the Lagrangian leads to the following
conjecture: to minimize L (), the assignment of Lagrange multiplier-weighted z-
values to performance categories must be positive assortative in the direction of agent
utilities.
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To develop intuition, we assume differentiability and obtain:
L′ (0) =
∑
n
pinw
′
n (0)− λ′ (0)
[∑
n
pinu (wn (0)) zn (0)− c
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1) = 0
− λ(0)
∑
n
pin · u′ (wn (0)) zn (0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) = 1/λ(0)
·w′n (0) +
∑
n
pinu (wn (0)) z
′
n (0)

=
∑
n
pinw
′
n (0)− 0−
∑
n
pinw
′
n (0)− λ (0)
∑
n
pinu (wn (0)) z
′
n (0)
=− λ (0)
∑
n
pinu (wn (0)) z
′
n (0)
= λ (0) (z′′ − z′) [u (wk (0))− u (wj (0))] .
In the above expression, (1) = 0 because the (IC) constraint binds under the original
contract, and (2) = 1/λ (0) by Lemma 1. These findings resolve our concerns raised
in Section 3.1, showing that the effects of our perturbation on the Lagrange multiplier
and wages are negligible.
To complete the proof, notice that L′ (0) ≥ 0 by optimality, and that L′ (0) 6= 0 be-
cause λ (0) > 0, z′′ 6= z′ and wj (0) 6= wk (0) (Lemma 2). Combining yields L′ (0) > 0,
so our conjecture is indeed true. The result of Z-convexity is then immediate: if
a performance category contains extreme but not intermediate z-values, then the
assignment of z-values goes in the wrong direction and an improvement can be con-
structed.
The above proof strategy yields the endogenous direction of sorting raw data into
performance categories, which is relatively straightforward in the baseline model but is
less so in later extensions. The proof of Appendix A.1 does not assume differentiability
and handles the limited liability constraint, too.
3.4 Implications
Strict MLRP Theorem 1 implies that the signal generated by any optimal monitor-
ing technology must satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (hereinafter,
strict MLRP) with respect to the order induced by z-values:
Definition 2. For any A,A′ ∈ Σ of positive measures, A z A′ if z (A) ≤ z (A′).
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Corollary 1. The signal X : Ω→ P∗ generated by any optimal monitoring technology
P∗ satisfies strict MLRP with respect to z, i.e., for any A,A′ ∈ P∗, A z A′ if and
only if z (A) < z (A′).
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
While the signal generated by any monitoring technology trivially satisfies the
weak MLRP with respect to
z (i.e., replace “<” with “≤” in Corollary 1), it violates
the strict MLRP in the presence of multiple performance categories that attain the
same z-value. By contrast, the signal generated by any optimal monitoring technol-
ogy must satisfy the strict MLRP with respect to
z, because merging performance
categories of the same z-value saves the monitoring cost while leaving the incentive
cost unaffected.
Comparative statics The parameter µ captures factors that affect the (opportu-
nity) cost of data processing and analysis. Factors that reduce µ include, but are not
limited to: the advent of IT-based HR management systems in the 90’s, advancements
in speech analytics, increases in computing power, etc..
To facilitate comparative statics analysis, we write any choice of the optimal in-
centive contract as 〈P∗(µ), w∗(·;µ)〉 in order to make its dependence on µ explicit:
Proposition 1. Fix any 0 < µ < µ′. For any choices of 〈P∗(µ), w∗(·;µ)〉 and
〈P∗ (µ′) , w∗ (·;µ′)〉:
(i)
∑
A∈P(µ)
P1 (A)w
∗ (A;µ) ≤
∑
A∈P(µ′)
P1 (A)w
∗ (A;µ′);
(ii) H (P∗ (µ) , 1) ≥ H (P∗ (µ′) , 1);
(iii) |P∗(µ)| ≥ |P∗(µ′)| under Assumption 4(a).
Proof. Part (i) follows from the optimalities of P∗(µ) and P∗(µ′). Parts (ii) and (ii)
are immediate.
Proposition 1 shows that as data processing and analysis become cheaper, the
principal pays less wage on average, and the information carried by the output signal
becomes finer. In the case where the monitoring cost is an increasing function of the
rating scale (see, e.g., Hook et al. (2011)), the optimal rating scale is nonincreasing
in µ. For other monitoring cost functions such as entropy, we can first compute the
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cutoff z-values and then the optimal rating scale as in Example 2.10 Figure 1 plots
the numerical solutions obtained in a special case.
2
3
4
5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
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|P
|
Figure 1: Plot the optimal rating scale against µ: entropy cost, u (w) =
√
w, Z ∼
U [−1/2, 1/2], c = 1, K = 100.
The above findings are consistent with several strands of empirical facts. Among
others, access to IT has proven to increase the fineness of the performance grids
among manufacturing companies, holding other things constant (Bloom and Van
Reenen (2006, 2007, 2010), Bloom et al. (2012)).11 Crowdsourcing the processing and
analysis of real-time data has enabled the “exact individual diagnosis” that separates
distinctive and mediocre performers in companies like GE and Zalando (Ewenstein et
al. (2016)). Finally, the adoption of speech analytics tools has increased the fineness
of the performance ratings among call center agents (Singer (2013)).
10In general, this is not an easy task because perturbations of cutoff z-values (which differ from the
perturbation considered in Section 3.3) affect wages endogenously through the Lagrange multipliers
of the incentive constraints.
11See the appendices of Bloom and Van Reenen (2006, 2007) for survey questions regarding the
fineness of the performance grids, e.g., “Each employee is given a red light (not performing), an
amber light (doing well and meeting targets), a green light (consistently meeting targets, very high
performer) and a blue light (high performer capable of promotion of up to two levels),” versus
“rewards is based on an individual’s commitment to the company measured by seniority.”
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4 Extension: Multiple Agents
4.1 Setup
Each of the two agents i = 1, 2 earns a payoff ui (wi) − ci (ai) from spending a
nonnegative wage wi ≥ 0 and exerting either high effort (ai = 1) or low effort (ai = 0).
The function ui : R+ → R satisfies ui (0) = 0, u′i > 0 and u′′i < 0, and ci (1) = ci >
ci (0) = 0.
Each effort profile a = a1a2 generates a probability space (Ω,Σ, Pa), where (1) Ω
is a finite-dimensional Euclidean space comprising both agents’ performance data, (2)
Σ is the Borel sigma-algebra on Ω, and (3) Pa is the probability measure on (Ω,Σ)
conditional on the effort profile being a. In particular, Pa’s are mutually absolutely
continuous, and the probability density function pa’s they induce are well-defined and
everywhere positive.
In this new setting, a monitoring technology P can be any partition of Ω with at
most K cells—all of positive measures, and a wage scheme w : P → R2+ maps each
cell A of P to a vector w (A) = (w1 (A) , w2 (A))> of nonnegative wages. For each
data point ω, let A (ω) be the unique performance category that contains ω, and let
w (A (ω)) be the wage vector associated with A (ω). Time evolves as follows:
1. the principal commits to 〈P ,w (·)〉;
2. agent i privately chooses ai ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2;
3. Nature draws ω from Ω according to Pa;
4. the monitoring technology outputs A (ω);
5. the principal pays wi (A (ω)) to agent i = 1, 2.
Consider the problem of inducing both agents to exert high effort. Write 1 for
(1, 1)>. Define a vector-valued random variable Z = (Z1, Z2)
> by
Zi (ω) = 1− pai=0,a−i=1 (ω)
p1 (ω)
∀ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, 2,
and define the z-value of any set A ∈ Σ of positive measure by (z1 (A) , z2 (A))>,
where
zi (A) = E [Zi | A; a = 1] ∀i = 1, 2.
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A contract is incentive compatible for agent i if∑
A∈P
P1(A)ui (wi (A)) zi (A) ≥ ci, (ICi)
and it satisfies agent i’s limited liability constraint if
wi (A) ≥ 0 ∀A ∈ P . (LLi)
An optimal contract minimizes the total implementation cost under the high effort
profile, subject to agents’ incentive compatibility constraints and limited liability
constraints:
min
〈P,w(·)〉
∑
A∈P
Pa(A)
2∑
i=1
wi(A) + µ ·H(P ,1) s.t. (ICi) and (LLi), i = 1, 2.
4.2 Analysis
The next definition generalizes Z-convexity:
Definition 3. A set A ∈ Σ is Z-convex if the following holds for any ω′, ω′′ ∈ A such
that Z (ω′) 6= Z (ω′′):
{ω ∈ Ω : Z (ω) = (1− s) · Z (ω′) + s · Z (ω′′) for some s ∈ (0, 1)} ⊂ A.
The next two assumptions impose regularities on the principal’s problem analo-
gously to Assumptions 2 and 3:
Assumption 5. Z is distributed atomelessly on a connect set Z (Ω) in R2 under
a = 1.
Assumption 6. Z (Ω) is compact set in R2 with dim Z (Ω) = 2.
The next theorems extend Theorems 1 and 2 to encompass multiple agents:
Theorem 3. Assume Assumptions 1, 5 and 6. Then any optimal monitoring tech-
nology P∗ comprises Z-convex cells that constitute convex polygons in R2.
Theorem 4. An optimal incentive contract that induces high effort from both agents
exists under Assumptions 1, 4, 5 and 6.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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Proof sketch The proof strategy developed in Section 3.3 is useful for handling
vector-valued z-values and wages. As before, fix any  > 0, and take any subsets
A′ and A
′′
 of two different performance categories Aj and Ak, respectively, such that
P1 (A
′
) = P1 (A
′′
 ) =  and z (A
′
) := z
′ 6= z (A′′ ) := z′′ (Lemma 5 of Appendix A.2.1
proves existence of sets that satisfy weaker properties). Post the perturbation as in
Section 3.3, the principal’s Lagrangian becomes (again ignore the (LL) constraints):
L () =
∑
n
pin
[∑
i
wi,n ()− λi ()ui (wi,n ()) zi,n ()− ci
]
,
where pin denotes the probability of An (equivalently, An ()) under a = 1, wi,n ()
denotes agent i’s optimal wage at An (), and λi () the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the (ICi) constraint. Assuming differentiability, we obtain:
L′ (0) = −
N∑
n=1
pin · u>n
(
λ1 (0) 0
0 λ2 (0)
)
d
d
zn ()
∣∣∣∣
=0
= (uk − uj)> (ẑ′′ − ẑ′) ,
where
un := (u1 (wi,n (0)) , u2 (wi,n (0)))
> for n = 1, · · · , N,
and
ẑ :=
(
λ1 (0) 0
0 λ2 (0)
)
z for z = z′, z′′.
Since L′(0) ≥ 0 by optimality, the assignment of the Lagrange multiplier-weighted z-
values into performance categories must be “positive assortative,” where the direction
of sorting is given by the vector of agents’ utilities. This implies Z-convexity, for the
same reason as that given in Section 3.3.
Implications Solving the optimal convex polygons is computationally hard. That
said, notice that the boundaries of convex polygons consist of straight line segments
in Z (Ω), and combining with Assumption 5 yields the following observations:
• any bi-partitional contract takes the form of either a team or a tournament and
is fully captured by the intercept and slope of the straight line as depicted in
Figure 2;
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Figure 2: Bi-partitional contracts: team and tournament.
• contracts that evaluate and reward agents on an individual basis are fully de-
termined by the individual performance cutoffs as depicted in Figure 3.
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W2=0	
W1=0	
W2>0	
Z1	
Z2	
Figure 3: An individual incentive contract.
4.3 Application: Individual vs. Group Evaluation
This section examines the difference between individual and group performance eval-
uations from the angle of monitoring cost. To obtain the sharpest insights, suppose
that agents are technologically independent :
Assumption 7. There exist probability spaces {(Ωi,Σi, Pi,ai)}i,ai as in Section 2 such
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that for any a ∈ {0, 1}2:
(Ω,Σ, Pa) = (Ω1 × Ω2,Σ1 ⊗ Σ2, P1,a1 × P2,a2) .
In the language of contract theory, Assumption 7 rules out any technology linkage
(i.e., ωi depends on a−i) or common productivity shock (i.e., ω1, ω2 are correlated
given a) between the agents.
The next definition is standard:
Definition 4. (i) P is an individual monitoring technology if for any A ∈ P, there
exist A1 ∈ Σ1 and A2 ∈ Σ2 such that A = A1 × A2; otherwise P is a group
monitoring technology;
(ii) Let P be any individual monitoring technology. Then w : P → R2+ is an indi-
vidual wage scheme if wi
(
Ai × A′−i;P
)
= wi
(
Ai × A′′−i;P
)
for any i = 1, 2 and
Ai × A′−i, Ai × A′′−i ∈ P; otherwise w : P → R2+ is a group wage scheme;
(iii) 〈P ,w : P → R2+〉 is an individual incentive contract if P is an individual
monitoring technology and w : P → R2+ is an individual wage scheme; otherwise
it is a group incentive contract.
By definition, a group incentive contract either conducts group performance eval-
uation or pairs individual performance evaluation with group incentive pay. Under
Assumption 7, the second option is sub-optimal by the sufficient statistics principle
or Holmstro¨m (1982), thus reducing the comparison between individual and group
incentive contracts to that of individual and group performance evaluations.
Let I be the ratio between the minimal cost of implementing bi-partitional incen-
tive contracts and that of implementing individual incentive contracts (the latter, by
definition, have at least four performance categories). I < 1 is a definitive indicator
that group evaluation is optimal whereas individual evaluation is not. The next result
is immediate:
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 1, 4(a), 5, 6 and 7, I < 1 when µ is large.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is thus omitted.
Beyond the case considered in Corollary 2, we can compute I numerically based on
the prior discussion about how to parameterize bi-partitional and individual incentive
contracts. Figure 4 plots the solutions obtained in a special case.
22
1.0
1.1
1.2
0 5 10 15 20 25
µ
I
Figure 4: Plot I against µ: entropy cost, ui (w) =
√
w, Zi ∼ U [−1/2, 1/2] and ci = 1
for i = 1, 2.
Our result formalizes the theses of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Lazear and
Rosen (1981), namely either team or tournament should be the dominant incentive
system when individual performance evaluation is too costly to conduct. It enriches
the analyses of Holmstro¨m (1982), Green and Stokey (1983) and Mookherjee (1984),
which attribute the use of group incentive contracts to the technological dependence
between agents while abstracting away from the issue of data processing and anal-
ysis. Recently, these views are reconciled by Bloom and Van Reenen (2006, 2007),
which find–just as our theory predicts–that companies make different choices between
individual and group evaluations despite being technologically similar. Furthermore,
group evaluation is most prevalent when the capacity to sift out individual-level infor-
mation is limited by, e.g., the lack of IT access.12 In the future, it will be interesting
to nail down the role of IT in Bloom and Van Reenen (2006, 2007), and to replicate
these studies for recent advancements in data technologies.
12See the survey questions of Bloom and Van Reenen (2006, 2007) regarding the choices between
individual and group evaluations, e.g., “employees are rewarded based on their individual contribu-
tions to the company,” and “compensation is based on shift/plant-level outcomes.” The former is
regarded as an advanced but expensive managerial practice and is more prevalent among companies
with better IT access, other things being equal.
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5 Extension: Multiple Actions
In this section, suppose that the agent’s action space A is a finite set, and that taking
an action a in A incurs a cost c (a) to the agent and generates a probability space
(Ω,Σ, Pa) as in Section 2. The principal wishes to induce the most costly action a
∗,
i.e., c (a∗) > c (a) ∀a ∈ D := A − {a∗}. For each deviation a ∈ D from a∗, define a
random variable Za : Ω→ R by
Za (ω) = 1− pa (ω)
pa∗ (ω)
∀ω ∈ Ω.
For each a ∈ D and set A ∈ Σ of positive measure, define
za (A) = E [Za | A; a∗] .
A contract is incentive compatible if for all a ∈ D:∑
A∈P
Pa∗ (A)u (w (A)) za (A) ≥ c (a∗)− c (a) . (ICa)
An optimal incentive contract 〈P∗, w∗ (·)〉 that induces a∗, or optimal incentive con-
tract for short, solves:
min
〈P,w(·)〉
∑
A∈P
Pa∗ (A)w (A) + µ ·H (P , a∗) s.t. (ICa) ∀a ∈ D and (LL). (5.1)
Write Z for (Za)
>
a∈D. For any |D|-vector λ = (λa)>a∈D in R|D|+ , define a random
variable Zλ : Ω→ R by
Zλ (ω) = λ
>Z (ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
The next definition generalizes Z-convexity:
Definition 5. A set A ∈ Σ is Zλ-convex if the following holds for any ω′, ω′′ ∈ A
such that Zλ (ω
′) 6= Zλ (ω′′):
{ω : Zλ (ω) = (1− s) · Zλ (ω′) + s · Zλ (ω′′) for some s ∈ (0, 1)} ⊂ A.
The next theorems extend Theorems 1 and 2 to encompass multiple actions:
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Theorem 5. Assume Assumption 1 and Assumption 3 for all a ∈ D. Then for any
optimal incentive contract 〈P∗, w∗ (·)〉 that induces a∗, there exists λ∗ ∈ R|D|+ with
maxa∈D λ∗a > 0 such that all cells of P∗, labeled as A1, · · · , AN , are Zλ∗-convex, and
0 = w∗ (A1) < · · · < w∗ (AN). Assume, in addition, Assumption 2 for all a ∈ D.
Then there exist −∞ ≤ ẑ0 < · · · < ẑN < +∞ such that An = {ω : Zλ∗ (ω) ∈ [ẑn−1, ẑn)}
for n = 1, · · · , N .
Theorem 6. Assume Assumptions 1 and 3, as well as Assumptions 2 and 4 for all
a ∈ D. Then an optimal incentive contract that induces a∗ exists.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In the presence of multiple actions, each data point is associated with finitely many
z-values, each corresponding to a deviation from a∗ that the agent can potentially
commit. By establishing that the assignment of Lagrange multiplier-weighted z-
values into wage categories is positive assortative, Theorem 5 relates the focus of data
processing and analysis to the agent’s endogenous tendencies to commit deviations.
Intuitively, when λ∗a is large and hence the agent is tempted to commit deviation a,
focus should be given to the information Za that helps detect deviation a, and the
final performance rating should vary significantly with the assessment of Za. The
next section gives an application of this result.
5.1 Application: Multiple Tasks
A single agent can exert either high effort (ai = 1) or low effort (ai = 0) in each
of the two tasks i = 1, 2, where each ai independently generates a probability space
(Ωi,Σi, Pi,ai) as in Section 2. The goal of a risk-neutral principal is to induce high
effort in both tasks.
Write a = a1a2, ω = ω1ω2, A = {11, 01, 10, 00}, a∗ = 11 and D = {01, 10, 00}.
For each i = 1, 2 and ωi ∈ Ωi, define
Zi (ωi) = 1− pi,ai=0 (ωi)
pi,ai=1 (ωi)
,
where pi,ai is the probability density function induced by Pi,ai . For each ω ∈ Ω1×Ω2
and λ = (λ01, λ10, λ00)
> ∈ R3+, define
Zλ (ω) = (λ01 + λ00) · Z1(ω1) + (λ10 + λ00) · Z2 (ω2)− λ00 · Z1 (ω1)Z2 (ω2) .
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Then,
Corollary 3. Assume Assumption 1 and Assumption 3 for all a ∈ D. Then for
any optimal incentive contract 〈P∗, w∗ (·)〉 that induces high effort in both tasks, there
exists λ∗ ∈ R3+ with λ∗01 + λ∗00 and λ∗10 + λ∗00 > 0 such that all cells of P∗, labeled as
A1, · · · , AN , are Zλ∗-convex, and 0 = w∗ (A1) < · · · < w∗ (AN). Assume, in addition,
Assumption 2 for all a ∈ D. Then there exist −∞ ≤ ẑ0 < · · · < ẑN < +∞ such that
An = {ω : Zλ∗ (ω) ∈ [ẑn−1, ẑn)} for n = 1, · · · , N .
Proof. The proof is the exact same as that of Theorem 5 and is therefore omitted.
In a seminal paper, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) shows that when the agent
faces multiple tasks, over-incentivizing tasks that generate precise performance data
may prevent the completion of tasks that generate noisy performance data. That
analysis abstracts away from monitoring costs and focuses on the power of (linear)
compensation schemes.
Corollary 3 delivers a different message: if the principal’s main problem is to
allocate limited resources across the assessment of multiple task performances, then
the optimal resource allocation should reflect the agent’s endogenous tendency to
shirk each task. The usefulness of this result is illustrated by the next example:
Example 3. A cashier faces two tasks: to scan items and to project warmth to
customers. A piece of performance data consists of the scanner data recorded by
the point of sale (POS) system, as well as the feedback gathered from customers (all
encoded in binary digits). By Corollary 3, the following ratio:
R =
λ∗01 + λ
∗
00
λ∗10 + λ
∗
00
captures how the principal should allocate limited resources across the assessment of
skillfulness (in scanning items) and warmth. Intuitively, a small R arises when the
cashier is reluctant to project warmth to customers, in which case resources should be
concentrated on the assessment of warmth, and the final performance rating should
depend significantly on such assessment.
We examine how the optimal resource allocation depends on the precisions of the
raw performance data. As in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991), we assume that:
• ωi = ai + ξi for i = 1, 2, where ξi’s are independent normal random variables
with mean zero and variances σ2i ’s;
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• the cashier has CARA utility of consumption u(w) = 1− exp (−γw).
Unlike Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991), we do not confine ourselves to linear wage
schemes.
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Figure 5: Plot R against σ21: H (P , a) = f (|P|), |P| = 2; u (w) = 1 − exp (−.5w);
c (00) = 0, c (01) = 0.3, c (10) = 0.2 and c (11) = 0.5; ξ1 and ξ2 are normally
distributed with mean zero and σ22 = 1.
In the case where the monitoring cost is an increasing function of the rating scale,
we compute R for different values of σ21 while holding σ
2
2 = 1 and |P| = 2 fixed. Our
findings are reported in Figure 5. Assuming that our parameter choices are reasonable
ones, we arrive at the following conclusion: as skillfulness becomes easier to measure–
thanks to the availability of high quality scanner data–the cashier becomes more
afraid to shirk the scanning task and less so about projecting coldness to customers;
to correct the agent’s incentive, resources should be shifted towards the processing
and analysis of customer feedback and away from that of the scanner data. In the
future, one can test this prediction by running field experiments as that of Bloom et
al. (2013). For example, one can randomize the quality of the scanner data among
otherwise similar stores and see how it affects the resource allocation between scanner
data and customer feedback.
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6 Conclusion
We conclude by posing a few open questions. First, our work is broadly related to the
burgeoning literature on information design (see, e.g., Bergemann and Morris (2017)
for a survey), and we hope that it inspires new research questions such as how to
conduct costly and yet flexible monitoring in long-term employment relationships.
Second, our theory may guide investigations into empirical issues such as how ad-
vancements in big data technologies have affected the design and implementation of
monitoring technologies, and whether they can partially explain the heterogeneity in
the internal organizations of otherwise similar firms. We hope that someone, maybe
ourselves, will carry out these research agendas in the future.
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 3
In this appendix, write any N -partitional contract 〈P , w(·)〉 as its corresponding tuple
〈An, pin, zn, wn〉Nn=1, where An is a generic cell of P , pin = P1 (An), zn = z (An) and
wn = w (An). Assume w.l.o.g. that z1 ≤ · · · ≤ zN .
A.1.1 Useful Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Given any monitoring technology as in Lemma 1, the principal’s problem
becomes:
min
〈w˜n〉Nn=1
N∑
n=1
pinw˜n − λ
[
N∑
n=1
pinu (w˜n) zn − c
]
−
N∑
n=1
ηnw˜n,
where λ and ηn denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the (IC) constraint
and the (LL) constraint at w˜n, respectively. Differentiating the objective function
with respect to w˜n and setting the result equal to zero yields λznu
′ (wn) = 1− ηn/pin.
Therefore, u′ (wn) = 1/ (λzn) if and only if wn > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
28
Proof. Let 〈An, pin, zn, wn〉Nn=1 be the corresponding tuple to any optimal incentive
contract that induces high effort from the agent. By Assumption 1(b), if wj = wk for
some j 6= k, then merging Aj and Ak into a single cell has no effect on the incentive
cost but strictly reduces the monitoring cost, thus contradicting the optimality of the
original contract. Then from Lemma 1 and the assumption that z1 ≤ · · · ≤ zN , it
follows that 0 ≤ w1 < · · · < wN and that z1 < · · · < zN . In particular, we must
have z1 < 0 because
∑
n pinzn = 0. Then w1 = 0, because otherwise replacing w1
with zero reduces the expected wage and relaxes the (IC) constraint while keeping
the (LL) constraint satisfied. Finally, combining wn > 0 for all n ≥ 2 and Lemma 1
yields zn > 0 for all n ≥ 2.
Lemma 3. For any A ∈ Σ with P1 (A) > 0 and any  ∈ (0, P1 (A)], there exists
A ⊂ A such that P1 (A) =  and z (A) = z (A).
Proof. Let A be as above. Since P1 admits a density, it follows that for any t ∈
(0, P1(A)], there exists Bt ⊂ A such that P1 (Bt) = t and Z (ω′) ≤ Z (ω) for any
ω ∈ Bt and any ω′ ∈ A \Bt. Likewise, there exists Ct ⊂ A such that P1 (Ct) = t and
Z (ω′) ≥ Z (ω) for any ω ∈ Ct and any ω′ ∈ A \ Ct. Finally, define B0 = C0 = ∅.
Let  be as above. Consider Bt ∪ C−t, where t ∈ [0, ]. Since z (Bt) ≥ z (A) and
z (C−t) ≤ z (A) for any t ∈ (0, ), whereas z (Bt ∪ C−t) is continuous in t because P1
admits a density, there exists t ∈ [0, ] such that z (Bt ∪ C−t) = z (A). Furthermore,
P1 (Bt ∪ C−t) =  by construction, so let A = Bt ∪ C−t and we are done.
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Take any optimal incentive contract that induces high effort from the agent
and let 〈An, pin, zn, wn〉Nn=1 be the corresponding tuple. Suppose, to the contrary, that
some Aj is not Z-convex. By Definition 1, there exist A
′, A′′ ⊂ Aj and A˜ ⊂ Ak,
k 6= j such that (i) P1 (A′), P1 (A′′), P1(A˜) > 0, and (ii) z˜ = (1− s) z′ + sz′′,
where z′ := z (A′) 6= z′′ := z (A′′) and z˜ := z(A˜). By Lemma 3, for any  ∈
(0,min{P1 (A′) , P1 (A′′) , P1(A˜)}), there exist A′ ⊂ A′, A′′ ⊂ A′′ and A˜ ⊂ A˜ such that
(i) P1 (A
′
) = P1 (A
′′
 ) = P1(A˜) = , and (ii) z (A
′
) = z
′, z (A′′ ) = z
′′ and z(A˜) = z˜.
Consider two perturbations to the monitoring technology: (a) move A′ to Ak and
A˜ to Aj; (b) move A˜ to Aj and A
′′
 to Ak. By construction, neither perturbation
affects the probability distribution of the output signal under high effort and hence
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the monitoring cost. Below we demonstrate that one of them strictly reduces the
incentive cost compared to the optimal contract prior to the perturbation.
Perturbation (a) Let 〈An(), pin, zn()〉Nn=1 be the tuple associated with the mon-
itoring technology after perturbation (a). By construction, Aj () = (Aj ∪ A˜) \ A′,
so
zj () =
pijzj − z′ + z˜
pij
= zj +
s (z′′ − z′)
pij
,
where the second equality uses z˜ = (1− s)z′ + sz′′. Likewise, Ak () = (Ak ∪ A′) \ A˜
and An () = An for n 6= j, k, and similar algebraic manipulation as above yields:
zj () = zj +
s (z′′ − z′)
pij
,
zk () = zk − s (z
′′ − z′)
pik
,
zn () = zn ∀n 6= j, k.
(A.1)
Take any wage profile 〈wn ()〉Nn=1 such that w1 () = 0 and the (IC) constraint remains
binding after the perturbation, i.e.,
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn ()) zn () =
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn) zn = c. (A.2)
A careful inspection of (A.1) and (A.2) reveals the existence of M > 0 independent
of  such that when  is small, we can construct a wage profile as above that satisfies
|wn ()− wn| < M for all n and hence the (LL) constraint by Lemma 2.13
With a slight abuse of notation, write w˙n () = (wn ()− wn) / and z˙n () =
(zn ()− zn) /.14 Notice that w˙1 () = 0. When  is small, expanding (A.2) using the
twice-differentiability of u (·) and |wn ()− wn| ∼ O () yields:
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn) zn =
N∑
n=1
pin
(
u (wn) + u
′(wn) · w˙n () · +O(2)
)
(zn + z˙n () · ) .
13To be precise, recall that u (wn), zn > 0 for n ≥ 2 by Lemma 2, so in particular zn () > 0 for
n ≥ 2 when  is small. Solving 〈xn〉Nn=2 such that
∑N
n=2 pinu (xn) zn () =
∑N
n=2 pinu (wn) zn yields
〈wn ()〉Nn=2 as above when  is small.
14Notice that we do not assume differentiability of wn () and zn () with respect to . The same
disclaimer applies to the remainder of this paper.
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Multiply both sides of the above equation by the Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 associated
with the (IC) constraint prior to the perturbation. Rearranging yields:
N∑
n=1
pin · u′ (wn) · λzn · w˙n () = −λ
N∑
n=1
u (wn) · pinz˙n () +O () .
Finally, simplifying the left-hand side of the above equation using w˙1 () = 0 and
u′ (wn) = 1/ (λzn) for n ≥ 2 (Lemmas 1 and 2) and the right-hand side using (A.1)
yields:
N∑
n=1
pinw˙n () = s [u (wk)− u (wj)] (λz′′ − λz′) +O () . (A.3)
The left-hand side of (A.3) represents the marginal effect of perturbation (a) on the
incentive cost incurred by the above constructed wage profile.
Perturbation (b) Repeating the above argument step by step for perturbation (b)
yields:
N∑
n=1
pinw˙n () = −λ (1− s) [u (wk)− u (wj)] (z′′ − z′) +O () . (A.4)
Then from u (wj) 6= u (wk) (Lemma 2), z′ 6= z′′ (by assumption) and λ > 0, it
follows that either (A.3) or (A.4) is strictly negative when  is small. That is, for
either perturbation (a) or (b), we can construct a wage profile that strictly reduces
the incentive cost compared to the optimal contract prior to the perturbation, thus
reaching a contradiction.
A.1.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. By Theorem 1, any optimal monitoring technology with at mostN ∈ {2, · · · , K}
cells is fully characterized by N−1 cutpoints ẑ1, · · · , ẑN−1 satisfying minZ (Ω) ≤ ẑ1 ≤
· · · ≤ ẑN−1 ≤ maxZ (Ω). Write ẑ = (ẑ1, · · · , ẑN−1)>. Define
ZN = {ẑ : minZ (Ω) ≤ ẑ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ẑN−1 ≤ maxZ (Ω)} ,
equip ZN with the sup norm ‖ · ‖,15 and note that ZN is compact by Assumption 3.
Let W (ẑ) be the minimal incentive cost for inducing high effort from the agent when
15‖ · ‖ denotes the sup norm in the remainder of this paper.
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the cutpoints are given by ẑ. Note that W (ẑ) is finite if and only if minZ (Ω) < ẑn <
maxZ (Ω) for some n, because then z (A) 6≡ 0 across the performance category A’s
formed under ẑ, and so W (ẑ) can be solved by applying Lemma 1.
We proceed in two steps:
Step 1 Show that W (ẑ) is continuous in ẑ.
Fix any N ∈ {2, · · · , K} and any ẑ ∈ ZN such that W (ẑ) is finite. W.l.o.g.,
consider the case where ẑn’s are all distinct. For sufficiently small δ > 0, let ẑ
δ be
any element of ZN such that ‖ẑδ − ẑ‖ < δ. Let pin and zn (resp. piδn and zδn) denote
the probability (under a = 1) and z-value of An = {ω : Z (ω) ∈ [ẑn−1, ẑn)} (resp.
Aδn =
{
ω : Z(ω) ∈ [ẑδn−1, ẑδn)
}
), respectively. Let wn denote the optimal wage at An.
Fix any  > 0, and consider the wage profile that pays wn +  at A
δ
n if z
δ
n > 0
and wn otherwise. By construction, this wage profile satisfies the (LL) constraint.
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, it satisfies the (IC) constraint when δ is sufficiently
small, because
lim
δ→0
∑
n
piδnu
(
wn + 1zδn>0 · 
)
zδn =
∑
n
pinu (wn + 1zn>0 · ) zn > c,
where the inequality uses the fact that
∑
n pinzn = 0 and zn 6≡ 0 and so zn > 0 for
some n. In addition, since
lim
δ→0
∑
n
piδn
(
wn + 1zδn>0 · 
)
=
∑
n
pin (wn + 1zn>0 · ) ,
it follows that when δ is sufficiently small,
W
(
ẑδ
)−W (ẑ) ≤∑
n
piδn
(
wn + 1zδn>0 · 
)−∑
n
pinwn < ,
where the first inequality uses the fact that the above constructed wage profile may
not be optimal when the cutpoints are given by ẑδ. Finally, interchanging the roles
between ẑ and ẑδ in the above derivation yields W (ẑ) −W (ẑδ) < , implying that
for any  > 0,
∣∣W (ẑδ)−W (ẑ)∣∣ <  when δ is sufficiently small.
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Step 2 Under Assumption 4(a), the following quantity:
WN := min
ẑ∈ZN
W (ẑ)
exists for any N ∈ {2, · · · , K} by Step 1 and the compactness of ZN . Let mN denote
the minimal number of the performance categories formed by the solution(s) to the
above problem. Solving
min
2≤N≤K
WN + µ · f (mN)
yields the solution(s) to the principal’s problem.
Under Assumption 4(b), the principal’s problem can be written as follows:
min
ẑ∈ZK
W (ẑ) + µ · h (pi (ẑ)) ,
where pi (ẑ) is the probability vector formed under ẑ and is clearly continuous in
ẑ. The existence of solution(s) to the above problem follows from Step 1 and the
compactness of ZK .
A.2 Proof of Section 4
In this appendix, write any N -partitional contract 〈P ,w(·)〉 as its corresponding tuple
〈An, pin, zn,wn〉Nn=1, where An is a generic cell of P , pin = P1 (An), zn = (z1,n, z2,n)> =
(z1 (An) , z2 (An))
> and wn = (w1,n, w2,n)
> = (w1 (An) , w2 (An))
>.
A.2.1 Useful Lemmas
The next lemma generalizes Lemmas 1 and 2 to encompass multiple agents:
Lemma 4. Assume Assumption 1. Then under any optimal incentive contract, (i)
there exist λ1, λ2 > 0 such that for any i and n, u
′
i (wi,n) = 1/ (λizi,n) if and only if
wi,n > 0; (ii) wj 6= wk for any j 6= k.
Proof. Fix any monitoring technology and rewrite the principal’s problem as follows:
min
〈w˜i,n〉
∑
i,n
pinw˜i,n −
∑
i
λi
[∑
n
pinui (w˜i,n) zi,n − ci
]
−
∑
i,n
ηi,nw˜i,n,
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where λi and ηi,n denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the (ICi) constraint
and the (LLi) constraint at w˜i,n, respectively. Differentiating the above objective
function with respect to w˜i,n and setting the result equal to zero yields the first-order
condition in Part (i). The proof of Part (ii) is the exact same as that of Lemma 2
and is therefore omitted.
The next lemma plays an analogous role as that of Lemma 3:
Lemma 5. Assume Assumption 6. Fix any δ > 0 and any A ∈ Σ such that P1 (A) >
0. Then for any  ∈ (0, P1 (A)], there exists A ⊂ A such that P1 (A) =  and
‖z (A)− z (A) ‖ < δ.
Proof. With a slight abuse of notation, let P be any finite partition of Ω such that
any B ∈ P is measurable and satisfies ‖Z (ω) − Z (ω′) ‖ < δ for any ω, ω′ ∈ B. P
exists because P1 admits a density and Z (Ω) is a compact set in R2 by Assumption 6.
Define P+ = {B ∈ P : P1 (A ∩B) > 0} and P0 = {B ∈ P : P1 (A ∩B) = 0}, which
are both finite. Therefore,
∑
B∈P0 P1 (A ∩B) = 0,
∑
B∈P+ P1 (A ∩B) = P1 (A) and
z (A) =
∑
B∈P+ P1 (A ∩B) z (A ∩B).
Since P1 admits a density, for any B ∈ P+, there exists CB ⊂ A ∩ B such that
P1 (CB) = P1 (A ∩B) /P1 (A). Moreover, ‖z (CB)−z (A ∩B) ‖ < δ by construction.
Let A = ∪B∈P+CB. Then P1 (A) =
∑
B∈P+ P1 (A ∩B) /P1 (A) = , and
‖z (A)− z (A) ‖ = ‖
∑
B∈P+
P1 (A ∩B)
P1 (A)
(z (CB)− z (A ∩B)) ‖
≤
∑
B∈P+
P1 (A ∩B)
P1 (A)
‖z (CB)− z (A ∩B) ‖ < δ.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Take any optimal incentive contract that induces high effort from both agents
and let 〈An, pin, zn,wn〉Nn=1 be the corresponding tuple. Suppose, to the contrary,
that some Aj is not Z-convex. By definition, there exist A
′, A′′ ⊂ Aj and A˜ ∈ Ak,
k 6= j such that (i) P1 (A′), P1 (A′′), P1(A˜) > 0, and (ii) z˜ = (1 − s)z′ + sz′′ for
some s ∈ (0, 1), where z′ := z (A′) 6= z′′ := z (A′′) and z˜ := z(A˜). By Lemma 5, for
any δ > 0 and  ∈ (0,min{P1(A′), P1(A′′), P1(A˜}), there exist A′ ⊂ A′, A′′ ⊂ A′′
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and A˜ ⊂ A˜ such that (i) P1 (A′′ ) = P1 (A′′ ) = P1(A˜) = , and (ii) ‖z (A′) − z′|,
‖z (A′′ )− z′′‖, ‖z(A˜)− z˜‖ < δ.
Consider two perturbations to the monitoring technology: (a) move A′ to Ak and
A˜ to Aj; (b) move A˜ to Aj and A
′′
 to Ak. By Assumption 1, neither perturbation
affects the probability distribution of the output signal under a = 1 and hence the
monitoring cost. Below we demonstrate that one of the perturbations strictly reduces
the incentive cost compared to the optimal contract prior to the perturbation.
Perturbation (a) Let 〈An () , pin, zn ()〉Nn=1 denote the tuple associated with the
monitoring technology after perturbation (a), where Aj () = (Aj ∪ A˜) \A′, Ak () =
(Ak ∪ A′) \ A˜ and An () = An for n 6= j, k. Then,
zj() = zj +
z(A˜)− z (A′)
pij
,
zk() = zk − z(A˜)− z (A
′
)
pik
,
zn() = zn ∀n 6= j, k,
(A.5)
where
‖z(A˜)− z (A′)− (z˜− z′) ‖ ≤‖z(A˜)− z˜‖+ ‖z (A′)− z′‖
< min
{
2δ, 4 max
ω∈Ω
‖Z (ω) ‖
}
. (A.6)
Define Bi = {n : wi,n = 0} for i = 1, 2. Let 〈wn ()〉Nn=1 be any wage profile that such
that for each i = 1, 2: (1) wi,n () = wi,n = 0 for n ∈ Bi, and (2) agent i’s incentive
compatibility constraint remains binding after perturbation (a), i.e.,
N∑
n=1
pinui (wi,n ()) zi,n () =
N∑
n=1
pinui (wi,n) zi,n = ci. (A.7)
A careful inspection of (A.5) and (A.6) reveals the existence of M > 0 independent
of  and δ such that when  is sufficiently small, we can construct a wage profile as
above that satisfies ‖wn ()−wn‖ < M for all n and hence the (LLi) constraints.
With a slight abuse of notation, write w˙n () = (wn ()−wn) / and z˙n () =
(zn ()− zn) /, and note that w˙i,n () = 0 for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ Bi. Expanding (A.7)
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and multiplying the result by the Lagrange multiplier λi > 0 associated with the (ICi)
constraint prior to the perturbation, we obtain the following when  is small:
N∑
n=1
pin · u′i (wi,n) · λizi,n · w˙i,n () = −λi
N∑
n=1
ui (wi,n) · pinz˙i,n () +O () .
Simplifying the left-hand side using w˙i,n () = 0 if n ∈ Bi and u′ (wi,n) = 1/ (λizi,n) if
n /∈ Bi (Lemma 4) and the right-hand side using (A.5) yields:∑
i,n
pinw˙i,n = (uk − uj)> Λ (z(A˜)− z (A′)) +O () ,
where un = (u1 (w1,n) , u2 (w2,n))
> for n = k, j and Λ =
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)
. Further simplifying
using (A.6) and z˜ = (1− s)z′ + sz′′ yields the following when δ is small:∑
i,n
pinw˙i,n = (uk − uj)> Λ (z˜− z′) +O ()
+ (uk − uj)> Λ (z(A˜)− z (A′)− (z˜− z′))
=s (uk − uj)> Λ (z′′ − z′) +O () +O (δ) . (A.8)
Perturbation (b) Repeating the above argument for perturbation (b) yields:∑
i,n
pinw˙i,n = −(1− s) (uk − uj)> Λ (z′′ − z′) +O () +O (δ) . (A.9)
Consider two cases:
Case 1 (uk − uj)> Λ (z′′ − z′) 6= 0. In this case, (A.8) and (A.9) have the opposite signs
when  and δ are sufficiently small, and the remainder of the proof is the exact
same as that of Theorem 1.
Case 2 (uk − uj)> Λ (z′′ − z′) = 0. In this case, note that (uk − uj)> Λ 6= 0> by Lemma
4, where 0 denotes the 2-vector of zeros. Then from Assumption 5, which says
that the distribution of Z is atomeless, there exist B′ ⊂ A′, B′′ ⊂ A′′ and B˜ ⊂ A˜
such that P1 (B
′), P1 (B′′), P1(B˜) > 0, z(B˜) = (1− s′) z (B′)+s′z (B′′) for some
s′ ∈ (0, 1) and (uk − uj)> Λ (z (B′′)− z (B′)) 6= 0. Replacing A′, A′′ and A˜ with
B′, B′′ and B˜, respectively, in the above argument gives the desired result.
36
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. By Theorem 3, any optimal monitoring technology with at mostN ∈ {2, · · · , K}
cells is fully characterized by (1) a finite number qN of vertices z1, · · · , zqN in Z (Ω),
and (2) an qN × qN adjacency matrix M whose lm’th entry equals 1 if zl and zm
are connected by a line segment and 0 otherwise. By definition, M is symmetric and
so is determined by its upper triangle entries, which can be either 0 or 1. Thus, M
belongs to MN := {0, 1}qN×(qN−1)/2, which is a finite set.
Write ~z for (z1, · · · , zqN )>. For any N ∈ {2, · · · , K} and any adjacency matrix
M ∈MN , define
ZN (M) = {~z : (~z,M) partitions Z (Ω) into at most N convex polygons} ,
equip ZN (M) with the sup norm ‖ · ‖, and notice that ZN (M) is compact by As-
sumption 6. Let W (~z,M) denote the minimal incentive cost for inducing high effort
from both agents when the monitoring technology is formed by (~z,M). W (~z,M) is
finite if and only if for each i = 1, 2, zi (A) 6≡ 0 across the performance category A’s
formed under (~z,M).
We proceed in two steps:
Step 1 Show that W (~z,M) is continuous in ~z for any N ∈ {2, · · · , K} and any
M ∈MN .
Fix any ~z ∈ ZN (M) such that W (~z,M) is finite. W.l.o.g., consider the case where
zl’s are all distinct. For sufficiently small δ > 0, let ~z
δ be any element of ZN (M)
such that ‖~zδ − ~z‖ < δ. Label the performance categories formed under (~z,M) and(
~zδ,M
)
as An’s and A
δ
n’s, respectively, such that for each n = 1, 2, · · · , zl is a vertex
of cl (Z (An)) if and only if z
δ
l is a vertex of cl
(
Z
(
Aδn
))
. Let pin and zi,n (resp. pi
δ
n and
zδi,n) denote the probability (under a = 1) and zi-value of An (resp. A
δ
n), respectively.
Let wi,n denote the optimal wage of agent i at An.
Take any  > 0 and consider the wage profile that pays wi,n + /2 to agent i if
zδi,n > 0 and wi,n otherwise. By construction, this wage profile satisfies the (LLi)
constraint. Under Assumptions 5 and 6, it satisfies the (ICi) constraint when δ is
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sufficiently small, because
lim
δ→0
∑
n
piδi,nu
(
wi,n + 1zδi,n>0 · /2
)
zδn =
∑
n
pinu
(
wi,n + 1zi,n>0 · /2
)
zi,n > ci,
where the inequality uses the fact that
∑
n pinzi,n = 0 and zi,n 6≡ 0 and so zi,n > 0 for
some n. In addition, since
lim
δ→0
∑
i,n
piδn
(
wi,n + 1zδi,n>0 · /2
)
=
∑
i,n
pin
(
wi,n + 1zi,n>0 · /2
)
,
it follows that when δ is sufficiently small,
W
(
~zδ,M
)−W (~z,M) ≤∑
i,n
piδn
(
wi,n + 1zδi,n>0 · /2
)
−
∑
i,n
pinwi,n < ,
where the first inequality uses the fact that the above constructed wage profile is not
necessarily optimal under
(
~zδ,M
)
. Finally, interchanging the roles between ~zδ and
~z in the above derivation yields W
(
~zδ,M
) −W (~zδ,M) < , implying that for any
 > 0,
∣∣W (~zδ,M)−W (~zδ,M)∣∣ <  when δ is sufficiently small.
Step 2 Under Assumption 4(a), the following quantity:
WN := min
M∈MN ,~z∈ZN (M)
W (~z,M)
exists for any N ∈ {2, · · · , K} by Step 1, the compactness of ZN (M) and the finite-
ness of MN . Under Assumption 4(b), the principal’s problem can be written as
follows:
min
M∈MK ,~z∈ZK(M)
W (~z,M) + µ · h (pi (~z,M)) ,
where pi (~z,M) is the probability vector induced by (~z,M) and is clearly continuous
in ~z. The remainder of the proof is the exact same as that of Theorem 2 and is
therefore omitted.
A.3 Proofs of Section 5
In this appendix, write z (A) = (za (A))
>
a∈D for any set A ∈ Σ of positive mea-
sure. Also write any N -partitional contract 〈P , w (·)〉 as its corresponding tuple
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〈An, pin, zn, wn〉Nn=1, where An is a generic cell of P , pin = Pa∗ (An), zn = z (An) and
wn = w (An). Assume w.l.o.g. that w1 ≤ · · · ≤ wN .
A.3.1 Useful Lemma
The next lemma generalizes Lemmas 1 and 2 to encompass multiple agents:
Lemma 6. Assume Assumption 1. Then for any optimal incentive contract that
induces a∗, (i) there exists λ ∈ R|D|+ with ‖λ‖ > 0 such that u′ (wn) = 1/
(
λ>zn
)
if
and only if wn > 0; (ii) λ
>z1 < 0 < λ>z2 < · · · and 0 = w1 < w2 < · · · .
Proof. Fix any monitoring technology and rewrite the principal’s problem as follows:
min
〈w˜n〉
∑
n
pinw˜n −
∑
n
pinu (w˜n) · λ>zn −
∑
n
ηnw˜n,
where λ denotes the profile of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the (ICa) con-
straints’ and ηn denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the (LL) constraint
at wn. Notice that ‖λ‖ > 0, because otherwise all incentive constraints are slack, so
replacing every wn > 0 with wn−  reduces the incentive cost while keeping all (ICa)
constraints and the (LL) constraint satisfied when  > 0 is small. Differentiating the
above objective function with respect to wn and setting the result equal to zero yields
the first-order condition in Part (i). The proof of Part (ii) is the exact same as that
of Lemma 2 and is therefore omitted.
A.3.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Take any optimal incentive contract that induces a∗. Let 〈An, pin, zn, wn〉Nn=1
be the corresponding tuple and λ be the profile of the Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with the (ICa) constraints. Suppose, to the contrary, that some Aj is
not Zλ-convex. Then there exist A
′, A′′ ⊂ Aj and A˜ ⊂ Ak, k 6= j such that
(i) Pa∗ (A
′) , Pa∗ (A′′) , Pa∗(A˜) > 0, and (ii) λ>z˜ = (1− s)λ>z′ + sλ>z′′, where
z′ := z (A′), z′′ := z (A′′), z˜ := z(A˜) and λ>z′ 6= λ>z′′. By Lemma 3, for any
 ∈ (0,min{Pa∗ (A′) , Pa∗ (A′′) , Pa∗(A˜)}), there exist A′ ⊂ A′, A′′ ⊂ A′′ and A˜ ⊂
A˜ such that (i) Pa∗ (A
′
) = Pa∗ (A
′′
 ) = Pa∗(A˜) = , and (ii) λ
>z (A′) = λ
>z′,
λ>z (A′′ ) = λ
>z′ and λ>z(A˜) = λ>z˜.
Consider two perturbations to the monitoring technology: (a) move A′ to Ak
and A˜ to Aj, and (b) move A˜ to Aj and A
′′
 to Ak. By Assumption 1, neither
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perturbation affects the probability distribution of the output signal under action
a∗ and hence the monitoring cost. Below we demonstrate that one of them strictly
reduces the incentive cost compared to the optimal contract prior to the perturbation.
Perturbation (a) Let 〈An(), pin, zn ()〉Nn=1 be the tuple associated with the mon-
itoring technology after perturbation (a), where Aj () = (Aj ∪ A˜) \ A′, Ak () =
(Ak ∪ A′) \ A˜ and An () = An for n 6= j, k. By construction,
zj () = zj +
z(A˜)− z (A′)
pij
,
zk () = zk − z(A˜)− z (A
′
)
pik
,
zn () = zn ∀n 6= j, k,
(A.10)
where
‖z(A˜)− z (A′) ‖ ≤ ‖z(A˜)‖+ ‖z (A′) ‖ ≤ 2 max
ω∈Ω
‖Z (ω) ‖. (A.11)
Let 〈wn ()〉Nn=1 be any wage profile such that w1 () = w1 = 0. A careful inspection
of (A.10) and (A.11) reveals the existence of M > 0 such that when  is sufficiently
small, we can construct a wage profile as above that satisfies (1) |wn ()− wn| < M
for all n and hence the (LL) constraint, as well as (2)
0 ≤
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn ()) za,n ()−
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn) za,n ∼ O () ∀a ∈ D (A.12)
and hence all (ICa) constraints. To see why, define κa =
∑N
n=2 pinu (wn) za,n and Sa =
{〈xn〉Nn=2 ∈ RN−1 :
∑N
n=2 xnza,n ≥ κa} for each a ∈ D, and notice that 〈pinu (wn)〉Nn=2 ∈
∩a∈DSa. If, to the contrary, we cannot construct the wage profile as above, then there
exist a′, a′′ ∈ D such that ∩a=a′,a′′{〈xn〉Nn=2 ∈ RN−1 :
∑N
n=2 xnza,n ≥ κa} = {〈xn〉Nn=2 ∈
RN−1 :
∑N
n=2 xnza′,n = κa′} or, equivalently, za′′,n = −za′,n for n = 2, · · · , N and
κa′′ = −κa′ . In the meantime, κa ≥ c (a∗)− c (a) > 0 for all a ∈ D, which leads to a
contradiction.
Write w˙n = (wn() − wn)/ and z˙n () = (zn ()− zn) /. Expanding (A.12) and
40
multiplying the result by λ, we obtain the following when  is small:
N∑
n=1
pin · u′ (wn) · λ>zn · w˙n () = −
N∑
n=1
u (wn) · pin · λ>z˙n () +O () .
Now, since w˙1 () = 0 and u
′ (wn) = 1/
(
λ>zn
)
for n ≥ 2 (Lemma 6), whereas
λ>z˙j () = λ>(z˜− z′) = −λ>z˙k () and z˙n () = 0 for n 6= k, j, simplifying the above
equation yields:
N∑
n=1
pinw˙n () = s [u (wk)− u (wj)]
(
λ>z′′ − λ>z′)+O () . (A.13)
Perturbation (b) Repeating the above argument for perturbation (b) yields:
N∑
n=1
pinw˙n () = − (1− s) [u (wk)− u (wj)]
(
λ>z′′ − λ>z′)+O () . (A.14)
Since u (wk) 6= u (wj) by Lemma 6 and λ>z′′ 6= λ>z′ by assumption, (A.13) and
(A.14) have the opposite signs when  is small. The remainder of the proof is the
exact same as that of Theorem 1 and is therefore omitted.
A.3.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Define
Λ =
{
λ : λ ∈ R|D|+ and ‖λ‖|D| = 1
}
,
where ‖·‖|D| denotes the |D|-dimensional Euclidean norm. By Theorem 5, any optimal
monitoring technology with at most N ∈ {2, · · · , K} performance categories is fully
captured by λ ∈ Λ and N − 1 cutpoints ẑ1, · · · , ẑN−1 such that minω∈Ω λ>Z (ω) ≤
ẑ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ẑN−1 ≤ maxω∈Ω λ>Z (ω). Write ẑ = (ẑ1, · · · , ẑN−1). Define
ZN (λ) =
{
ẑ : min
ω∈Ω
λ>Z (ω) ≤ ẑ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ẑN−1 ≤ max
ω∈Ω
λ>Z (ω)
}
,
equip ZN(λ) with the sup norm ‖·‖, and notice that ZN(λ) is compact by Assumption
3. For any given pair (λ, z), write the minimal incentive cost for inducing a∗ as
W (λ, z), and notice that W (λ, z) is finite if and only if λa > 0 for all a ∈ D and
minω∈Ω λ>Z (ω) < ẑn < maxω∈Ω λ>Z (ω) for some n. The first condition is necessary:
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otherwise there exists a ∈ D such that za (A) ≡ 0 for all the performance category
A’s formed under (λ, z) and hence the (ICa) constraint will be violated.
We proceed in two steps:
Step 1 Show that W (λ, ẑ) is continuous in (λ, ẑ).
Fix any λ ∈ Λ, N ∈ {2, · · · , K}, and ẑ ∈ ZN (λ) such that W (λ, ẑ) is finite.
W.l.o.g., consider the case where all ẑn’s are distinct. For sufficiently small δ > 0,
let λδ and ẑδ be any element of Λ and ZN
(
λδ
)
, respectively, such that ‖λδ − λ‖|D|,
‖ẑδ − ẑ‖ < δ. Let pin and zn (resp. piδn and zδn) denote the probability (under
a = a∗) and the |D|-vector of z-values associated with performance category An ={
ω : λ>Z (ω) ∈ [ẑn−1, ẑn)
}
(resp. Aδn =
{
ω : λ>Z (ω) ∈ [ẑδn−1, ẑδn)
}
), respectively. Let
wn denote the optimal wage at An.
Fix any  > 0, and consider the wage profile that pays wn +  at A
δ
n if z
δ
a,n > 0
for all a ∈ D and wn otherwise. By construction, this wage profile satisfies the (LL)
constraint. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, it satisfies every (ICa) constraint when δ is
small, because
lim
δ→0
∑
n
u
(
wn +
∏
a′∈D
1zδ
a′,n>0
· 
)
piδnz
δ
a,n
=
∑
n
u
(
wn +
∏
a′∈D
1za′,n>0 · 
)
pinza,n
>
∑
n
u (wn) pinza,n,
where the last line uses the fact that
∑
n pinza′,n = 0 and za′,n is strictly increasing
in n for all a′ ∈ D, so there exists n such that ∏a′∈D 1za′,n>0 = 1. To complete the
proof, notice that
lim
δ→0
∑
n
piδn
(
wn +
∏
a∈D
1zδa,n>0 · 
)
=
∑
n
pin
(
wn +
∏
a∈D
1zδa,n>0 · 
)
,
so the following holds when δ is sufficiently small:
W
(
λδ, ẑδ
)−W (λ, ẑ) ≤∑
n
piδn
(
wn +
∏
a∈D
1zδa,n>0 · 
)
−
∑
n
pinwn < .
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Finally, interchanging the roles between (λ, z) and
(
λδ, zδ
)
in the above derivation
yieldsW (λ, ẑ)−W (λδ, ẑδ) < , implying that for any  > 0, ∣∣W (λδ, ẑδ)−W (λ, ẑ)∣∣ <
 when δ is sufficiently small.
Step 2 Under Assumption 4(a), the following quantity:
WN := min
λ∈Λ,ẑ∈ZN (λ)
W (λ, ẑ)
exists for any N ∈ {2, · · · , K} by Step 1 and the compactness of Λ and ZN (λ).
Under Assumption 4(b), the principal’s problem can be written as follows:
min
λ∈Λ,zˆ∈ZK(λ)
W (λ, ẑ) + µ · h (pi (λ, ẑ)) ,
where pi (λ, ẑ) denotes the probability vector induced by (λ, ẑ) and is continuous in
its argument. The remainder of the proof is the exact same as that of Theorem 2 and
is therefore omitted.
B Online Appendix (For Online Publication Only)
B.1 Individual Rationality
This section extends the baseline model to encompass the individual rationality con-
straint: ∑
A∈P
P1(A)u(w(A)) ≥ c+ u. (IR)
A wage scheme is w : P → R, and an optimal incentive contract that induces high
effort from the agent minimizes the total implementation cost, subject to the (IC)
and (IR) constraints.
Corollary 4. Under Assumption 1, any optimal monitoring technology comprises
Z-convex cells.
Proof. Take any optimal incentive contract and let 〈An, pin, zn, wn〉Nn=1 be the corre-
sponding tuple. Assume without loss of generality that z1 ≤ · · · ≤ zN .
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Step 1 Show that z1 < · · · < zN and w1 < · · · < wN .
Given 〈An, pin, zn〉Nn=1, the principal’s problem becomes:
min
〈w˜n〉Nn=1
N∑
n=1
pinw˜n − λ
[
N∑
n=1
pinu (w˜n) zn − c
]
− γ
[
N∑
n=1
pinu (w˜n)− (c+ u)
]
,
where λ and γ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the (IC) constraint and
the (IR) constraint, respectively. Differentiating the objective function with respect
to w˜n and setting the result equal to zero, we obtain:
u′ (wn) =
1
λzn + γ
.
Thus, if, to the contrary, zj = zk for some j 6= k, then wj = wk. But then merging Aj
and Ak into a single cell has no effect on the incentive cost but strictly reduces the
monitoring cost by Assumption 1(b), which contradicts the optimality of the original
contract. Thus zn’s are all distinct, and so are wn’s.
Step 2 Show Z-convexity.
Suppose, to the contrary, that some Aj is not Z-convex. Consider first perturba-
tion (a) in the proof of Theorem 1. Take any wage profile 〈wn()〉Nn=1 such that the
(IC) and (IR) constraints remain binding after the perturbation, i.e.,
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn ()) zn () =
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn) zn, (B.1)
and
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn ()) =
N∑
n=1
pinu (wn) . (B.2)
A careful inspection of (A.1), (B.1) and (B.2) reveals the existence of M > 0 such that
when  is sufficiently small, we can construct a wage profile as above such that |wn ()−
wn| < M for all n. To see why, define κ1 =
∑N
n=1 pinu (wn) zn, κ2 =
∑N
n=1 pinu (wn),
S1 = {〈xn〉Nn=1 ∈ RN :
∑N
n=1 xnzn ≥ κ1} and S2 = {〈xn〉Nn=1 ∈ RN :
∑N
n=1 xn ≥ κ2},
and notice that 〈pinu (wn)〉Nn=1 ∈ S1 ∩ S2. Then from z1 < · · · < zN , it follows that
dimS1 ∩ S2 = N , and combining with (A.1) gives the desired result.
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Write w˙n () = (wn ()− wn) / and z˙n () = (zn ()− zn) /, and let λ > 0 and
γ > 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the (IC) constraint and the
(IR) constraint prior to the perturbation, respectively. Expanding λ (B.1)+γ (B.2)
yields the following when  is small:
N∑
n=1
pin · u′ (wn) · (λzn + γ) · w˙n () = −λ
N∑
n=1
u (wn) · pinz˙n () +O () . (B.3)
Simplifying using u′ (wn) = 1λzn+γ and (A.1) yields:
N∑
n=1
pinw˙n () = s [u (wk)− u (wj)] (λz′′ − λz′) . (B.4)
Consider next perturbation (b). Similar algebraic manipulation yields:
N∑
n=1
pinw˙n () = −(1− s) [u (wk)− u (wj)] (λz′′ − λz′) . (B.5)
Since u (wj) 6= u (wk) and z′′ 6= z′, it follows that sgn (B.4) 6= sgn (B.5), and the
remainder of the proof is the exact same as that of Theorem 1.
B.2 Random Monitoring Technology
This appendix extends the baseline model to encompass random monitoring tech-
nologies. Specifically, let the monitoring technology q : Ω → ∆K be any mapping
from the raw data space to the K-dimensional simplex, and let the wage scheme be
w : {1, · · · , K} → R+. Time evolves as follows:
1. the principal commits to 〈q, w〉;
2. the agent privately chooses a ∈ {0, 1};
3. Nature draws ω ∈ Ω according to Pa;
4. the monitoring technology outputs n ∈ {1, · · · , K} with probability qn(ω);
5. the principal pays the promised wage wn.
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Under 〈q, w〉, the agent is assigned to performance category n with probability
pin =
∫
qn(ω)dP1 (ω)
if he exerts high effort. Define N = {n : pin > 0}. For each n ∈ N , define
zn =
∫
Z(ω)qn(ω)dP1(ω)/pin
as the z-value of performance category n. For each n /∈ N , define wn = 0. Then
〈q, w〉 is incentive compatible if ∑
n∈N
pinu (wn) zn ≥ c, (IC)
in which case the monitoring cost it incurs is proportional to the mutual information
between the raw data and the output signal conditional on high effort:
H (q, 1) =
∑
n∈N
∫
qn (ω) log
qn (ω)∫
qn (ω) dP1 (ω)
dP1 (ω) .
An optimal incentive contract 〈q∗, w∗〉 that induces high effort the agent, or optimal
incentive contract for short, solves:
min
〈q,w〉
K∑
n=1
pinwn + µ ·H(q, 1) s.t. (IC) and (LL). (B.6)
The next theorem gives characterizations of optimal incentive contracts:
Theorem 7. For any optimal incentive contract 〈q∗, w∗〉 that induces high effort from
the agent, (i) q∗ : Z (Ω)→ ∆K; (ii) min {w∗n : n ∈ N ∗} = 0; (iii) for any j, k ∈ N ∗,
w∗j 6= w∗k and q∗k (z) /q∗j (z) is strictly increasing in z if w∗j < w∗k.
Proof. Since the incentive cost is linear in q (ω) whereas the monitoring cost is convex
in q (ω), it follows that q∗ : Z (Ω)→ ∆K and that w∗j 6= w∗k for any j, k ∈ N ∗. Write
N ∗ = {1, · · · , N} and assume without loss of generality that w∗1 < · · · < w∗N . Then
w∗1 = 0, and the reason is given in the proof of Lemma 2. Differentiating the principal’s
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objective function with respect to q (z) and setting the result equal to zero, we obtain:
− w∗n + λu (w∗n) z = µ
[
log
q∗n (z)
q∗1 (z)
− log pi
∗
n
pi∗1
]
∀n = 2, · · · , N, (B.7)
where λ > 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the (IC) constraint.
The left-hand side of (B.7) is strictly increasing in z, thus proving Part (iii) of the
theorem.
The next theorem proves existence of optimal incentive contract:
Theorem 8. Assume Assumptions 2 and 3. Then an optimal incentive contract that
induces high effort from the agent exists.
Proof. For any given q, the wage-minimization problem admits solutions if and only
if zj 6= zk for some j, k ∈ N , in which case we denote the minimal incentive cost by
W (q). The principal’s problem is then:
min
q
W (q) + µ ·H (q, 1) ,
and any solution to this problem must be continuous differentiable on Z (Ω) by (B.7)
and Assumptions 2 and 3 (taking the usual care of the derivatives at the end points).
Define C1
(
Z (Ω) ,∆K
)
as the set of q’s as above, and equip C1
(
Z (Ω) ,∆K
)
with the
sup norm ‖ ·‖, i.e., ‖q′−q‖ = supz,n |q′n (z)−qn (z) |. Rewrite the principal’s problem
as follows:
min
q∈C1(Z(Ω),∆K)
W (q) + µ ·H (q, 1) ,
and notice that the objective function is continuous in q.
To prove existence of solutions, notice that
inf
q∈C1(Z(Ω),∆K)
W (q) + µ ·H (q, 1)
is a finite number, hereinafter denoted by x. Let
{
qk
}
be any sequence in C1
(
Z (Ω) ,∆K
)
such that limk→∞W
(
qk
)
+ µ · H (qk, 1) = x. Clearly, qk is uniformly bounded for
all k, and the family
{
qk
}
is equicontinuous by Assumption 3 and the definition of
C1
(
Z (Ω) ,∆K
)
. Thus, a subsequence of
{
qk
}
converges uniformly to some q∞ by
Helly’s selection theorem, and W (q∞) + µ · H (q∞, 1) = x by the continuity of the
objective function.
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